Having voted for the formation of the previous two MDC at City Hall – Old Oak & Park Royal Development Corporation (OOPR) and London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), when l was an Assembly Member, l looked with interest at the proposal for the one along Oxford Street to assist the pedestrianisation of Oxford Street. 

Looking at the map, it is strictly only the row of properties along Oxford St and the block there exist within between Marble Arch and Tottenham Court Road. So much smaller geographical and in scope to the other two MDCs already in existence, one of which dealt with the legacy of the Olympic Games around the main site in 4 boroughs and the other over 3 boroughs an industrial Estate that had been long in decline with much critical transport infrastructure.  

Quite simply the transfer of Oxford St to TfL, so as to become part of its red routes should be enough for these efforts by the Mayor. It is something he’ll have to do anyway along with the planning consent. Quite honestly Oxford St should have been transferred at the outset of the creation of the GLA and its bodies like TfL within their designated red routes.  So l would welcome the designation of Oxford St as a “GLA road” which should have been done many years ago when the GLA and TfL was set-up almost 25 years ago.

Doing it the MDC way, risks antagonising WCC by taking away their planning powers.The result being it will take a lot longer to accomplice the actual pedestrianisation and make the legal process of the transfer of Oxford St to TfL a lot longer l fear.  Furthermore, if it was refused planning by the Westminster City Council, it can surely be called in by the Mayor anyway! 

In the meantime, if TfL want to be seen to transform the West End it could start with the removing of rickshaws (pedicabs) now that it has the powers to do so, in the West End and putting more provision of public toilets in neighbourhoods like Soho which adjoin along Oxford Street.

Last Friday afternoon, after the consultation, Transport for London announced the end of the Bus Route 205 going to Paddington. So much for integrated transport folks !

As the 205 Bus linked up all the rail terminuses along the Marylebone/Euston Rd – from Paddington, Marylebone, Euston, through to Kings Cross  – making it easier for rail travellers to more between the stations with their luggage as well – as this will no longer be possible now!

It also shows that TfL have lost their collective institutional memory on such matters, as the 205 route in the early 2000’s, was offered as a bus link between the rail terminus stations north of the river. As it not only connected Paddington to Marylebone, Euston and Kings Cross rail stations but also Liverpool St as well in the East.  Surely there must be someone in TfL that remembers such understanding and agreements! I rather hoped the operators from these rail terminus stations otherwise known as ROCs reminder would be enough of a reminder but alas no, clearly!   

Executive Summary:

The conflict between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir has endured for over seven decades, originating from the tumultuous partition of British India in 1947.

This protracted dispute, rooted in competing claims and national identities, took on a perilous new dimension in 1998 when both nations openly declared their nuclear weapons capabilities. The possession of nuclear arsenals has elevated the stakes of any confrontation, transforming a regional territorial dispute into a potential global security crisis. Recent escalations, exemplified by the deadly attack on tourists in Pahalgam in April 2025, underscore the persistent volatility of the relationship and the ever-present risk of conflict

This report analyses the historical context, current dynamics, nuclear capabilities, potential escalation scenarios, and consequences of a nuclear conflict arising from the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir.

Introduction:

The Kashmir conflict stands as one of the most protracted and complex international disputes, casting a long shadow over South Asia since the independence and partition of India in 1947. The disagreement over the status of this picturesque Himalayan region has been a constant source of animosity between India and Pakistan, leading to multiple wars and countless skirmishes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both nations in 1998 marked a critical juncture, introducing a layer of strategic complexity and dramatically increasing the potential consequences of any future conflict. Nuclear deterrence now underpins the strategic calculations of both New Delhi and Islamabad, influencing their responses to regional crises. The recent surge in tensions following the brutal attack on tourists in Pahalgam in April 2025 has once again brought the region to the brink, raising alarm within the international community about the possibility of armed conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

This report aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the nuclear threat stemming from the enduring India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, examining the likelihood and potential ramifications of nuclear escalation.

Historical Roots of the Kashmir Conflict:

The genesis of the Kashmir conflict lies in the partition of British India in August 1947, which created the independent nations of India and Pakistan.2 The partition, based on religious demographics, did not neatly accommodate the princely states, granting them the choice to accede to either dominion or remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, a princely state with a Muslim-majority population ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, Hari Singh, initially chose to remain independent.

However, this decision was short-lived. In October 1947, facing a rebellion in the western districts and an invasion by Pakistani tribal militias, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to India for military assistance.2 In exchange for this aid, he signed the Instrument of Accession to India.1 India accepted the accession, contingent upon a future plebiscite to determine the will of the Kashmiri people. India subsequently referred the matter to the United Nations in January 1948.

The conflict over Kashmir has since escalated into several major wars between India and Pakistan. The first Indo-Pakistani War (1947-1948) ended with a UN-mediated ceasefire, establishing a ceasefire line that later became the Line of Control (LoC).1 This war resulted in the division of Kashmir, with India gaining control of approximately two-thirds of the state, including the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh, while Pakistan controlled roughly a third, known as Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. The second Indo-Pakistani War in 1965 was triggered by Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar, an attempt to infiltrate forces into Indian-administered Kashmir to incite an uprising. This war ended in a stalemate following international intervention.23 In 1999, a limited conflict erupted in the Kargil region when Pakistani soldiers and insurgents crossed the LoC.  This conflict, even after both nations possessed nuclear weapons, underscored the persistent risk of military escalation and ended with a US-brokered withdrawal. Beyond these major wars, numerous armed skirmishes and periods of heightened tension, including the 1971 war which led to the creation of Bangladesh and impacted the dynamics in Kashmir, have characterised the relationship.

The ceasefire line established after the first war was formalised as the Line of Control (LoC) through the Simla Agreement in 1972. While the Simla Agreement aimed to resolve differences through bilateral negotiations, the underlying dispute over Kashmir remained unresolved, leaving the LoC as a highly militarised de facto border. Frequent exchanges of fire across this volatile boundary, even with a ceasefire agreement in place since 2021 34, highlight the continued risk of unintended escalation

The Current State of India-Pakistan Relations and Kashmir:

The relationship between India and Pakistan, particularly concerning Kashmir, remains fraught with tension, as evidenced by recent escalations. In April 2025, a deadly militant attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, resulted in the killing of 26 tourists. This attack, one of the deadliest targeting civilians in recent years, triggered strong condemnation from India, which was quick to imply Pakistan’s involvement. While India did not immediately provide concrete evidence, this pattern of blaming Pakistan following attacks has become a recurring feature in their strained relationship.9 In response, Pakistan vehemently denied any role in the Pahalgam attack and offered to cooperate with a credible international probe.

The aftermath of the Pahalgam attack witnessed a rapid deterioration of diplomatic ties between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Both countries engaged in tit-for-tat measures, including downgrading diplomatic relations, expelling each other’s diplomats, and closing key land border crossings.2 These actions marked a new low in their already frigid relationship. Further escalating the situation, India announced the suspension of its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, a crucial water-sharing agreement that had remarkably survived previous wars. Pakistan responded by threatening to withdraw from the Simla Agreement, a cornerstone of their bilateral relations that established the LoC.

In addition to these diplomatic manoeuvres, military posturing along the Line of Control intensified. Reports emerged of gunfire exchanges between Indian and Pakistani troops in the days following the Pahalgam attack. Pakistan also test-fired a ballistic missile, the Abdali Weapon System, amid the heightened tensions, a move seen as a demonstration of its military readiness. Reports also indicated increased military activity and troop movements on both sides of the border.

Nuclear Capabilities of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Analysis:

India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed states, possess arsenals of comparable size. Estimates suggest that India has approximately 172 nuclear warheads, while Pakistan holds around 170.7 India is in the process of developing a nuclear triad, with delivery systems including land-based ballistic missiles like the Agni series, nuclear-capable aircraft such as the Mirage 2000 and Rafale, and sea-based capabilities with the Dhanush and K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).7 India’s focus appears to be expanding beyond Pakistan, with the development of longer-range missiles capable of reaching targets in China.47 Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal includes land-based missiles such as the Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen series, Ghauri, and Nasr, as well as nuclear-capable aircraft like the Mirage III/V and potentially the JF-17.52 Pakistan is also developing sea-based capabilities with the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) 80 and has emphasised the development of tactical nuclear weapons like the Nasr, intended for battlefield use against India’s larger conventional forces. Both nations are also reportedly developing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).55

India has a declared “No First Use” (NFU) policy, stating that it will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces. However, this policy has been subject to debate and potential reconsideration. In contrast, Pakistan adheres to a doctrine of “Full Spectrum Deterrence,” which includes the possibility of first use in response to a perceived existential threat or to counter large-scale conventional military attacks from India. This difference in declared doctrines highlights the asymmetry in their strategic postures.

Organisations like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provide annual assessments of global nuclear arsenals. Their data indicates a slight edge for India in the number of warheads in recent years , although estimates vary. SIPRI also notes the ongoing modernisation of nuclear forces by both countries. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) through its Nuclear Notebooks offers detailed analyses, highlighting the continuous development of new delivery systems and warhead technologies by both India and Pakistan. Both organisations underscore the lack of official transparency from both governments regarding the precise size and composition of their nuclear arsenals.

Assessing the Nuclear Threat: Likelihood and Scenarios of Escalation:

Expert opinions on the likelihood of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan in the context of the Kashmir dispute vary. Some analysts, like US political scientist John Mearsheimer, have expressed serious concerns, warning of a “real potential for nuclear use” due to the conventional military imbalance favouring India, which could compel Pakistan to resort to nuclear weapons if facing a significant defeat. Mearsheimer also noted the reduced US intervention in the current crisis compared to previous standoffs, potentially increasing the risk of escalation. In contrast, other experts believe that nuclear deterrence will likely hold, preventing a major war, but they also emphasise the persistent danger of miscalculation or misinterpretation, especially given the absence of robust crisis management mechanisms.34 The history of close calls between India and Pakistan underscores the fragility of this deterrence. Notably, historical US intelligence assessments from the 1980s and 90s also highlighted a significant risk of conventional conflict escalating to a nuclear exchange between the two nations.

Several potential triggers could lead to nuclear escalation in the India-Pakistan context. A major terrorist attack in Kashmir or mainland India, attributed to Pakistan-backed groups, could create immense domestic pressure on India to retaliate forcefully, potentially leading to actions that Pakistan might perceive as an existential threat.2 A large-scale conventional military setback for Pakistan could also trigger nuclear escalation. Given Pakistan’s “Full Spectrum Deterrence” doctrine, which emphasises the use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter India’s conventional superiority, a significant conventional defeat might prompt Pakistan to consider this option.7 Furthermore, the persistent lack of trust and effective communication channels between the two countries significantly increases the risk of miscalculation or misinterpretation of military movements, intentions, or signals during periods of heightened tension.

Plausible scenarios of nuclear conflict include the use of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan in response to a perceived imminent conventional defeat. This could then lead to retaliatory nuclear strikes by India, potentially escalating rapidly from tactical to strategic weapons. Another scenario involves a conventional conflict spiralling out of control, with either side perceiving a risk of decisive loss, leading to the use of strategic nuclear weapons against high-value targets.

Consequences of a Nuclear Conflict in South Asia:

The humanitarian impact of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic. Estimates suggest that a nuclear exchange could result in the immediate deaths of millions, potentially ranging from 50 to 125 million people, depending on the scale and yield of the weapons used. The densely populated nature of the subcontinent would exacerbate the casualty figures. Beyond the immediate deaths, a nuclear conflict would lead to mass displacement, widespread injuries, and long-term health effects due to radiation exposure. The already strained healthcare infrastructure in both countries would be quickly overwhelmed.

The environmental ramifications of a nuclear war in South Asia extend beyond the immediate region. Studies indicate a significant risk of nuclear winter, caused by the injection of massive amounts of black carbon into the upper atmosphere from nuclear detonations and the resulting firestorms. This could lead to a substantial drop in global temperatures and altered precipitation patterns for years. The impact on agriculture and ocean ecosystems would be devastating, potentially leading to global food shortages and famine. Plant growth could decrease significantly, and ocean productivity would likely plummet.

The economic and geopolitical repercussions of a nuclear conflict in South Asia would be severe. Both India and Pakistan would suffer devastating economic losses due to the destruction of infrastructure and the disruption of trade and economic activity. The conflict would also lead to significant regional destabilisation and have profound implications for global geopolitics. A nuclear exchange between two states would set a dangerous precedent and could undermine the international non-proliferation regime, potentially encouraging other nations to pursue nuclear weapons.

8. Diplomatic Efforts, De-escalation Measures, and Confidence Building:

The Kashmir conflict has been a subject of diplomatic initiatives since its inception. The United Nations played an early role, passing numerous resolutions on the issue. However, a mutually acceptable resolution has remained elusive due to the differing positions of India and Pakistan. While Pakistan has often sought international intervention, India has largely maintained that the Kashmir issue is a bilateral matter to be resolved through direct talks. The Simla Agreement of 1972 established the Line of Control and emphasised bilateral negotiations as the way forward. However, this framework has not led to a final settlement, and Pakistan’s recent threat to withdraw from the agreement highlights the ongoing tensions. In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, several countries, including Iran and the United States, have offered to mediate or urged de-escalation.

Over the years, India and Pakistan have implemented various Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) aimed at promoting trust and reducing tensions. These include political, military, economic, and people-to-people initiatives. A significant military CBM is the agreement on not attacking each other’s nuclear facilities, which has been maintained despite overall strained relations. However, the effectiveness of these CBMs has often been limited due to inconsistent implementation and the reversibility of many measures during periods of high tension.

De-escalation strategies hinge on the resumption of sustained dialogue between India and Pakistan at multiple levels. While India has been hesitant to accept third-party mediation on Kashmir, the current crisis has seen renewed calls for international involvement. Specific de-escalation measures could include restoring all communication channels, reaffirming commitment to existing CBMs, and avoiding any further provocative actions or rhetoric.

Nuclear Deterrence Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Perspectives:

The concept of the stability-instability paradox is particularly relevant in the context of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. While the presence of nuclear weapons may have deterred large-scale conventional wars, it has not prevented limited conventional conflicts or proxy wars below the nuclear threshold.

Evolving military technologies pose new challenges to nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia. The development of cyber warfare capabilities introduces the risk of attacks on critical infrastructure, including nuclear command and control systems.98 The difficulty in attributing cyberattacks further complicates the security landscape. India’s pursuit of missile defence systems could be perceived by Pakistan as an attempt to gain a first-strike advantage, potentially leading to a counter-buildup of offensive capabilities, such as MIRVs.69 The development of sea-based nuclear capabilities by both nations also introduces new ambiguities and complexities in strategic calculations at sea.

There are differing viewpoints on the long-term stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Some experts hold an optimistic view, arguing that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war will continue to deter large-scale conflict. Others maintain a pessimistic outlook, citing the inherent instability in the relationship, the risk of accidents and miscalculations, and the potential for escalation, making nuclear conflict a persistent and dangerous threat.

Conclusion and Recommendations:

The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir remains a deeply entrenched and highly complex issue with a significant nuclear dimension. The recent escalation following the Pahalgam attack underscores the persistent volatility of the relationship and the ever-present danger of military confrontation. The possession of nuclear weapons by both nations has raised the stakes dramatically, creating a scenario where any large-scale conflict carries the risk of catastrophic escalation. While nuclear deterrence has arguably prevented full-scale wars, it has not eliminated the possibility of limited conflicts or proxy wars, and the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation remains alarmingly high. The potential humanitarian, environmental, and geopolitical consequences of a nuclear conflict in South Asia are immense and would extend far beyond the immediate region. Therefore, addressing this enduring conflict and mitigating the nuclear threat requires sustained and concerted efforts from both India and Pakistan, as well as the active engagement of the international community.

To mitigate the nuclear threat and foster a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir conflict, the following recommendations are proposed:

For India and Pakistan:

• Re-establish and consistently maintain open channels of communication at all levels, including political, diplomatic, and military, to prevent misunderstandings and manage crises effectively.
• Reaffirm and strengthen existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), ensuring their consistent implementation and exploring new measures to enhance transparency and trust.
• Exercise utmost restraint in public rhetoric and military posturing, particularly in the aftermath of escalatory events.
• Seriously consider the establishment of institutionalised Nuclear Risk Reduction Center’s (NRRCs) to facilitate real-time communication and de-escalation during crises.
• Re-engage in meaningful dialogue to explore all possible peaceful mechanisms for resolving the Kashmir dispute, taking into account the aspirations of the Kashmiri people

For the International Community:

• Maintain consistent diplomatic pressure on India and Pakistan to de-escalate tensions and prioritise dialogue as the primary means of resolving their disputes.
• Offer impartial mediation and active support for bilateral negotiations if requested by both India and Pakistan, respecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Promote greater transparency regarding nuclear arsenals in the region through international engagement and verification efforts.
• Support and encourage initiatives that foster people-to-people contact, cultural exchanges, and economic cooperation between India and Pakistan to build trust at the societal level.
• Continuously highlight the potentially devastating global consequences of a nuclear conflict in South Asia to maintain international focus and urgency on de-escalation and peaceful resolution.

At yesterday’s AGM of the MCC at Lords, whilst there was a lot of talk in the press about turning the private club into a PLC, we have a very interesting discussion on the women membership efforts of the MCC in recent years. 

Mark Nicholas, the club chair, towards the end of a presentations on MCC governance referred to recent articles in the Sunday Times & The Times, said that the proposal to convert the club into a PLC had not come from within the club’s hierarchy, had no official status and was rather lacking in details. Certainly the proposal is was not on the AGM agenda and has not been put to a special General Meeting for later in the year. 

Having seen similar manoeuvrings around Manchester Utd Football Club over 25 years ago by Sky TV, l can’t help thinking that there are predator billionaire’s out there keen to pick up the MCC for small sum of money for them!

As a local member living in Marylebone, l have enjoyed going to Lords to watch and play cricket since my school days and long may this continue. Personally, this is neoliberalism in action.

We were also given a report back on Women’s membership of the MCC as a matter of discussion in the agenda of the meeting. Having recently assisted a women’s application, l was interested in what progress was being made at all. I found out that since historic 1998 vote, the MCC has replied on organic growth and as a result, the first women to reach the top of the waiting list, was not elected till 2018! In this respect, please see table below. So not much progress made at all, yet the women’s and girl’s is one of the fastest growing areas across cricket and all sports! Thus it was felt with the first women’s Test match at Lord’s to be held in 2026, to taking stock of the progress made in welcoming women into the club. 

Now at present rates of candidates awaiting election to become full membership – where only 531 out of 12,202 waiting were made full members in 2024 – you will have to late approximately 30 years before becoming a full member, if you joined today! This while, we still just have 556 women full members, which is less than 3 per cent of the total full membership. This after a special effort to encourage membership amongst female cricketers. This when we have a third of spectators attending matches are women as well.

So organic growth won’t be enough and a special effort needs being made and the discussion from the floor made for interesting reading. safe to say, there was a consensus certainly that something had to be done. 

So watch this space, to see if any further progress is being made on more women members to the MCC in the next 18 months. As for turning the MCC into a PLC, we’ll have to look out for a predator billionaire amongst our mists for sure now.  

I eventually went to see the Kyoto play at Soho Place Theatre on the last night even though l’d been promising myself to go since its opening in early January! And it was worth the wait for sure. 

The Kyoto Protocol was the very first agreement between the conference of the parties (COP) of the UN Framework Agreement on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) following the Rio Conference in 1992. It was put together in the first three COPs in the late nineties, and if it had been enacted  by the developed world for their 2010 targets, it would have gone along way to reducing the cost of adapting and mitigating climate change today when the situation is far worse.  

The play is based on the actual proceedings of the meeting and highlights well the impact of politicians like the late John Prescott from the UK and Angela Merkel from Germany when the COPs were much less of a circus that it has become with 10,000’s attending now and had politicians negotiating at the very end of the events with suspicious NGOs around as well, lobbying for the Oil & Gas industry.  Both vey ably bashed out an agreement between the developing and developed world which was a moment when the world agreed unanimously.  The play was undertaken in much humour as well for a serious topic of discourse 

A fire at St Marylebone Sub-Station in the middle of a densely packed residential neighbourhood in Church St Ward occurred this week, raises fundamental questions about having Sub-Stations in such locations in the first place. 

The news of the fire on Monday caught the attention of many local residents as the dense black clouds polluted the air and the smell of fire debris hanged in the air for the past few days in the neighbourhood.  Let us also not forget the impact it had on the canal, with an oil spill from the sub-station affecting a two mile stretch of the Regents Canal. And may well affected the Little Venice Canal Cavalcade hosted by the IWA over the coming bank holiday weekend. 

The fire caused damage to the roofs of two flats Elmton Court, Wharncliffee Gardens Estate along Cunningham Place, NW8. The sub-station is also right next door to Sanctuary Housing Estate to its immediate East, and thankfully no one was affected from there as well.

Interestingly we have had a number of sub-station fires in London this year including the one near Heathrow which closed down the airport. So maybe it is time for regulators to investigate why this is happening at all? Is our reliance on electricity mean we have sub-stations that can’t handle this energy transition we are attempting to make nationally as resilience of our infrastructure becomes an issue as well. 

There is also a passage going through the sub-station and l think there is very good case to close the Victoria Passage to pedestrian access and even re-locating the sub-station.  Particularly as we have the very big St John’s Wood Sub-Station just nearby on the other side of Lisson Grove. Do we really need two sub-stations so nearby together at all?! 

Bangladesh is currently experiencing a significant energy crisis characterised by power outages and supply shortages. This crisis is multifaceted, stemming from a combination of factors including rapid economic growth driving up electricity demand, depleting domestic gas reserves, and over reliance on imported energy sources.

Here’s a more detailed look at the situation with the key factors contributing to the Crisis: 

• Rising Electricity Demand:
  Bangladesh’s rapidly growing economy is leading to increased demand for electricity, especially from the industrial sector.
• Depleting Gas Reserves:
  Natural gas, a primary energy source for Bangladesh, is being depleted, impacting power generation.
• Over reliance on Imports:
  Bangladesh relies heavily on imported fuels like coal, diesel, and fuel oil to meet its energy needs, making it vulnerable to price fluctuations and supply disruptions.
• Inadequate Infrastructure:
  Transmission and distribution losses, as well as inefficiencies in power plants, further contribute to the energy crisis.
• Policy and Governance Issues:
  Concerns exist about the effectiveness of energy policies, including issues related to overpaying private sector projects and a lack of diversification in energy sources.
  Impact of the Crisis:
• Power Outages:
  Frequent and prolonged power cuts are disrupting daily life, affecting businesses, industries, and homes
• The energy crisis is hampering industrial production, particularly in energy-intensive sectors like textiles, leather, and RMG, leading to reduced competitiveness and potential losses. People are also facing inconvenience and hardship due to power outages, and the energy crisis is contributing to economic inequality.  To address the Crisis, we need the following: 
• Diversification of Energy Sources:
  Bangladesh needs to diversify its energy sources by investing in renewable energy technologies like solar and wind power.
• Energy Efficiency:
  Implementing measures to improve energy efficiency in all sectors, from production to consumption, is crucial.
• Infrastructure Development:
  Investing in upgrading and expanding the transmission and distribution infrastructure is necessary to reduce losses and improve reliability.
• Policy Reforms:
  Implementing effective energy policies that address the challenges of energy security, affordability, and sustainability is essential.
• Addressing Reliance on Imports:
  Developing domestic energy resources and reducing dependence on imported fuels is a long-term strategy for achieving energy independence.
  
  

While Pope Francis’ theology shares many aspects with liberation theology, particularly his focus on the poor and marginalised, he has never explicitly identified as a liberation theologian. He has been praised by liberation theologians for embodying the movement’s spirit through his actions and advocacy for the poor, but he has also been seen as taking a more nuanced approach, drawing on various theological perspectives while remaining distinct from the specific framework of liberation theology.

Pope Francis has consistently emphasised the church’s role in supporting the poor and marginalised, criticising capitalism, and advocating for social justice, all themes central to liberation theology. However, Pope Francis’ theology differs from traditional liberation theology in some key ways. He has not adopted the Marxist analysis of class struggle that characterised some earlier liberation theology, and he has a more nuanced approach to social science and political action, according to an article by Dissent Magazine. Pope Francis’ theology is seen as drawing on a wider range of theological perspectives, including those of the Second Vatican Council and those that emphasise a relational understanding of God and creation.

While he may not formally identify as a liberation theologian, his actions and statements, particularly his emphasis on the church’s role as “a church for the poor” and his selection of Francis de Assisi as his pontifical name, resonate with the core tenets of liberation theology. Additionally, Francis has said that “realities are more important than ideas”.

Whilst all is said and done, let us not forget his show of humanity with his support for the Palestinian Christians in Gaza whom he rang very night during the War in Gaza. And his love of football and support for his local boyhood team, San Lorenzo. Further evidence of his populist instincts. May he Rest in Peace. 

Since last December l have e-mailing the council for an update on the Lisson Green Estate Heat Network, just before the Autumn, thinking its one of the things the council can be doing to keep peoples energy bills down. I only got a response from the Winter but none the less its here now.

They said to me in an Whatapp response  “….we are currently tendering for a second stage feasibility study to build upon a concept study by BURO. They explored the option of creating a new large heat network in NW8 using local heat sources that include, the national grid station (along Lodge Rd, NW8), the local canal & TfL jubilee line. It determined that further detailed assessment should take place and that is what they are tendering for, It will initially cover Lisson Green Estate where we have 4 communal systems on the Estate and individually heated homes and Wharncliffe Gardens. ”  

So it’s clear to me this will not be operational for at least the winter of 2026, as we are still talking about feasibility studies and not even works on site. Whilst the brief has been extended to include Wharncliffee Gardens and also heat loss from the TfL Jubilee tracks going over the canal along Park Rd, NW8. 

So whilst it has been given prominence on the GLA database of energy proposals around London, its got a long way to go, as we are clearly more than a few years from it ever being operational and saving residents of the Lisson Green Estate. This while the priority is clearly in the South of the City with the updating urgently required of the